Behavioural determinants of Foreign Direct Investment by Pinheiro-Alves, Ricardo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Behavioural determinants of Foreign
Direct Investment
Ricardo Pinheiro-Alves
University of Bath, UK, Universidade da Beira Interior, Gabinete de
Estrategia e Estudos, MEI
21. July 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10297/
MPRA Paper No. 10297, posted 6. September 2008 09:16 UTC
 
Behavioural Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Ricardo Pinheiro-Alves1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
 
The paper presents a behavioural economics approach to foreign direct 
investment. Starting from the behavioural finance literature, it uses content 
analysis based on interviews covering 12% of the investments abroad made by 
Portuguese parent firms. The study presents evidence of several behavioural 
rules (e.g., herding, anchoring, overconfidence, mental accounting) in firms’ 
location decisions that originate a new set of determinants of FDI flows and 
complement the neoclassical paradigm. Moreover, it confirms the Heiner model 
(1983, 1985, 1989) by showing that the higher is the uncertainty faced by 
decision makers the more frequent is the use of behavioural rules. The central 
role of uncertainty helps explaining why FDI flows occur more frequently 
among developed countries. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
FDI theory has been developing on a partial-equilibrium basis and its empirical analysis is often not 
conclusive indicating that there are many determinants of FDI decisions and their role varies with 
context (countries, firms and so on – Blonigen, 2005). But theory seldom considers the role of 
managers within the decision making process. Psychologists recognize that managers, as human 
beings in general, have several motivational factors that are either intrinsic to their personality or 
shaped by their environment and may have multiple and changing objectives that are often 
contradictory (Frey and Eichenberger, 2001). Values are subject to choices and change with the 
personal experience of individuals. This change in values modifies the objectives that individuals 
attempt to attain (Akerlof, 1983). Given that managers have checks on their performance (from 
competition, shareholders, customers and employees) they often do make their choices more carefully 
than as if they acted as individuals. But managers are not immune to moral, cultural and other social 
influences usually disregarded by the economic literature.  
 
Moreover, the behavioural finance literature has shown (e.g. Shiller, 2003) that simpler decisions in 
equity markets or portfolio investment cannot be totally explained by a neoclassical approach. Thus, 
the role of managers seems suitable to provide a complementary perspective to mainstream economics, 
and thus an enrichment of FDI theory.  
 
The aim of this paper is to show that the behavioural approach can make a contribution to FDI theory 
by identifying a new set of determinants, similar to those presented in behavioural finance. These are 
rules of behaviour repeatedly followed by managers that motivate firms to choose exact locations in 
external markets.  
 
This approach is better suited than what is usually assumed in economic models to show the 
complexity of FDI location decisions because it gives a central role to the uncertainty (risk as part of 
known unknowns plus unknown unknowns) faced by managers. It is the purpose of this paper to 
display uncertainty in accordance with the reality of FDI location decisions. That is, to enhance the 
relevance of factors that go beyond the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory and to include 
behavioural characteristics that affect the perceptions of managers in their decision making process. 
Hence it is important to understand the different perceptions of managers and to understand how they 
impact real life FDI location decisions.  
 
The focus on uncertainty is based on the Heiner (1983, 1985, 1989) model of behaviour prediction. 
The use of a behavioural framework, based on the “behaviouralists” (e.g. Simon) and on economic 
psychology (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman), allows a better understanding of the key determinants in 
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FDI location decisions. The central idea of the model is the higher the uncertainty the higher should be 
the use of behavioural rules. It was theoretically applied to FDI in Hosseini (2005) and an empirical 
confirmation, using data from Portuguese firms, is made in the paper. 
 
The empirical work is based on interviews and the interpretation of information through content 
analysis as a complement to the enormous amount of quantitative work found in the FDI literature. 
This is reinforced by statistical tests in order to assess the results obtained in the qualitative work. The 
following section briefly reviews FDI theory by pointing to its limits while section 3 details the 
methodology and section 4 presents empirical evidence of behavioural rules. Section 5 deals with the 
role of uncertainty by testing the Heiner model and the paper ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2 – Limits in FDI theory 
 
Consider a firm deciding whether to invest abroad and where to locate its investment. A rational 
decision-maker attempts to maximize the present value of the difference between revenue and costs 
when answering these questions. For this end it must collect substantial information and by assuming a 
discount rate from the expected inflation, the desired rate of return and the presumed associated risk, it 
can calculate a net present value for the investment. 
 
The decision to invest abroad and where to locate the investment depends on the decision-maker’s 
expectations about the value of these variables for the various available alternatives. If the decision to 
go abroad is already made, the location of the investment, and its expected revenue and costs, becomes 
the relevant issue. Thus, one can consider that the two key variables for rational location decisions are 
revenue and costs. 
 
Economic literature has presented several explanations impacting revenue and costs for FDI to occur2. 
Transnational companies (TNC’s), when making FDI location decisions within imperfect markets, 
seek to improve their revenue stream in several ways. They use specific advantages over local 
competitors in the host market to compensate the additional costs of investing abroad. Several specific 
advantages are noted: product differentiation, managerial and marketing skills, innovation and 
technology, scale and agglomeration economies, better and cheaper access to capital and government 
induced distortions (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). 
 
                                                          
2 Ietto-Gillies (2005) provide all the references not mentioned in the text. 
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Knickerbocker uses risk mitigation concerns and defensive behaviour by “followers” against the 
aggressive behaviour of “first movers” to explain why firms in the same industry tend to invest in the 
same countries. The proximity-concentration model (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992, Brainard, 1993) 
explains multi-plant TNC´s and two-way horizontal FDI when it becomes relatively less expensive in 
comparison with exporting. Further explanations of location decisions are mainly related with the 
fragmentation of production processes by single-plant firms into different stages based on different 
relative factor endowments and thus prices across countries (the factor proportion model, Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985). In this case, vertical FDI is unidirectional (from richly endowed countries to cheaper 
labour endowed locations). 
 
The will to minimize transactional costs and thus to be more cost-efficient is also used by the FDI 
literature to explain location decisions. The transactional costs approach explains the occurrence of 
FDI (but not its exact location) from a cost comparison between market transactions and the internal 
allocation of resources. Penrose (1958) and Williamson (1975, 1981) state that the bigger and more 
complex is the firm or the better and cheaper the legal framework and existing information channels, 
the lower the potential advantages of internalization (both domestic and international) and the higher 
the incentive to operate within the market. Buckley and Casson, Hennart and Caves (1996) further 
developed this approach by stating that the resulting power of market imperfections (originating in 
less-tradable goods such as “research and development”, knowledge or intangible assets such as 
brands) are an incentive for internalization and thus for the formation of TNC’s. 
 
The main approach of a behavioural nature, where firms are seen as learning organizations, was 
developed by the Scandinavian school where the relevant factor for the location decision is psychic 
distance, that is, “… the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and to the market. 
Examples are differences in language, education, business practices, culture and industrial 
development” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, p. 24). 
 
All the above reasons are valid explanations for FDI or location decisions. However, they rely on a 
simple view about managers and decision-making in firms. Neoclassical economics sees firms and 
managers as rational profit maximizers where uncertainty is often reduced to risk so that 
rationalization conditions can be developed. In a world of certainty it would be easy for managers to 
make investment decisions abroad. They just would need to calculate the difference between revenue 
and costs for all the available options in terms of location and to choose the one that result in higher 
profitability. However, in the real world of a manager’s life things are not that simple. FDI location 
decisions require a huge amount of information, comprise different steps where a large number of 
small sequential decisions are made during several months or years, and the invested capital is 
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relatively immobile and focused on the long term (Aharoni, 1999). In the meantime environmental 
variables are permanently changing in unpredictable ways and decision makers are themselves 
affected by rather different events. The process involves a lot of different people that, directly or 
indirectly, influence the final location. Furthermore, each FDI location decision comprises not only the 
“economically rational” part but also the “behavioural” part, where perceptions and other cognitive 
features of managers are included (Katona, 1975).  
 
Therefore, a more complete definition of FDI location decisions, as the one provided by the 
behavioural approach, must also consider the way the behavioural component influences a FDI 
location decision by recognizing the relevance of managers’ cognitive characteristics within the 
decision-making process.  
 
Moreover, a feature of most decision making situations is the existence of uncertainty or “the absence 
of ability to decipher all of the complexity of the environment; especially one whose very structure 
itself evolves over time” (Heiner, 1983, p, 569). It includes, besides risk, the known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns. Contrary to risk, the remaining part of uncertainty cannot be mitigated and it is 
not possible to assign probabilities for each alternative (Knight, 1921). However, the behaviour of all 
types of agents is thought to be highly influenced by uncertainty and while neoclassical economics 
usually play down the outcomes to which they are not able to assign a probability the behavioural 
approach emphasizes it. That is, it differs from expected utility theory where risk and uncertainty are 
often faced as being the same thing while acting as a constraint to maximization (Hirshleifer and 
Riley, 1992, p. 10). 
 
The behavioural approach considers how uncertainty and the extrinsic and intrinsic cognitive 
characteristics of managers influence the decision-making process. It fully considers the FDI decision-
making process by giving uncertainty a central role in each step. This is very important for three 
reasons: First, the emphasis on rules of behaviour in this paper arises from the fact that most situations 
faced by decision makers are related to “nonreplicable uncertainty or even ignorance” (Heijdra, 1988, 
p. 83); Second because individuals usually deal with each event in a separate way before combining 
the outcomes and thus uncertainty is increased3 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This is applicable to 
each different step in FDI decisions where different persons participate; Third, as Alchian (1950) 
proposes, because it seems more sensible to develop a model from an initial situation of uncertainty 
and only then to add elements of foresight, and not to start it on a certain goal such as profit 
maximization and afterwards abandon it by considering uncertainty and different motives for agents’ 
                                                          
3 For example, the collection of information in FDI operations is done without previous knowledge of the 
location decision. 
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behaviour. Therefore, the behavioural approach highlights uncertainty as an evolving phenomenon by 
focusing on the cognitive characteristics of individuals as key to the decision-making process and, 
thus, as the basis of the changing expectations considered by the neoclassical theory. That is, the 
problems faced by decision makers change with uncertainty. 
 
It is within this complexity that behavioural rules arise. Behavioural rules are simplifying strategies to 
reduce complexity that are explained by uncertainty and initiate heuristics or biases that systematically 
deviate from the predictions of unbounded procedural rationality (Frey and Eichenberger, 2001). The 
behavioural perspective considers that managers, like any individual, when facing uncertainty are 
subject to errors and “anomalous” behaviour in decision making. Both may be corrected. But while 
errors may be a one time deviation from economic rationality explained by the limited capabilities of 
human beings, heuristics are sequential deviations, where intuition has a role and its own rationality, 
and are represented by systematic and predictable biases arising from behavioural rules. In a dynamic 
perspective, when agents are finally able to correct their anomalous behaviour the environment has 
changed in a significant way and, because a changing context impacts the perceptions of managers, 
agents have to permanently re-start their personal learning process to cope with the new environmental 
conditions. Therefore, the behavioural approach aims to identify the relevant durable patterns of firms’ 
behaviour.  
 
All heuristics that are recurrent and persist during a certain period of time because they are not 
immediately corrected through learning or incentives due to the limits of the human being may be 
considered as behavioural rules (Heiner, 1983, 1989; Arrow, 1996). This includes both FDI location 
decisions not consistent with the strategy and others that are also inconsistent with optimization. In the 
first case consistent decisions imply FDI operations to be within the broader strategy of the firm. If 
they are not and are kept throughout the years then a behavioural rule inconsistent with rationality is 
observed.  
 
Generally speaking, behavioural rules are usual choices typified in accordance with their place in the 
time span, that is, related with past or present events or concerning expectations about future 
developments, and by its intrinsic or extrinsic cognitive origin. A better understanding of each firm’s 
decision making process may be obtained by using the Heiner (1983, 1985, 1989) model, where the 
relative rigidity faced by decision-makers is emphasized and the usual optimization assumptions 
of the neoclassical literature are disregarded. The behavioural approach will use some inputs from 
psychology, namely the so called heuristics in decision making in the presence of uncertainty. This 
improves the understanding of the objectives and motivations of firms and managers when investing 
abroad.  
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The role of behavioural rules is not consensual, however. Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, p. 34, 35), for 
example, consider that experimental evidence on heuristics only translate certain limitations of the 
human mind and give an incorrect idea of how individuals behave in real situations when making 
really important decisions. Therefore, the authors say, heuristics do not affect the findings of the 
neoclassical approach when dealing with uncertainty because they can be avoided through learning 
and the right incentives. The issue, then, is if there are deviations of rational economic behaviour 
which are systematically followed by decision-makers even considering both learning and incentives.  
 
The behavioural finance literature has shown these rules of behaviour to exist. Many have been 
applied to financial markets and, although the actions and the outcomes of these markets are much 
more easily observable than in the case of foreign investment, some may be extrapolated to FDI 
decisions and complement the current literature. They are valid to explain information collection, 
selection of alternatives and for the final FDI location decision based on the information available. 
Thus, even without forming a unified model, they complement both the neoclassical and the traditional 
behavioural theories of the firm in the explanation of FDI.  
 
 
Table 1 – Taxonomy of behavioural rules in FDI decisions 
                       Type 
Time 
Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Past Learning, hindsight bias, Sunk 
costs, Mental accounting, 
Break-even effect, house 
money effect 
Historical anchoring, Cultural 
anchoring 
Framing, Representativeness Availability, Feelings, Fairness, 
Herding, Cascading, Signalling, False 
consensus bias, reputation-based 
herding, Inter-expert inconsistency 
Present 
Strategic inconsistencies 
Future Overconfidence, confirmatory 
bias 
 
 
 
 
A taxonomy of behavioural rules is presented in table 1. Columns are divided according to its source 
of motivation, the intrinsic or the extrinsic dimension of cognitive characteristics. The rows are 
divided according to the time reference that originates them. It is not an exhaustive list of all 
behavioural rules but of those that could apply to FDI operations. Given the large number of heuristics 
the paper is focused only on a subset. 
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Mental accounting explain investments abroad but not their exact location. Economic research has 
shown that risk taking behaviour is affected differently by prior gains and losses. Expected utility 
theory only considers incremental outcomes from current wealth when decisions are being made. That 
is, past experiences of decision makers, be it gains or losses, are not considered and choices must be 
invariant across problem descriptions. Thaler and Johnson (1990) show that under some circumstances 
investors find attractive opportunities to break-even after prior losses. People are more cautious when 
they are investing to earn money and more adventurous when they have the prospect of loosing 
because they fail to adapt to recoverable losses. Thus, a loss that is recoverable may induce risk 
behaviour. This indicates that managers are more willing to put additional money in a faltering venture 
when they have previously committed funds to it if they believe it is possible to recover current losses. 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) also show that investors with prior gains may be more willing to accept a 
higher risk (the house money effect) as long as the prior outcome is not totally cancelled, that is, as 
long as the potential loss is lower than the prior gain. This is a situation where investors have a feeling 
of control or the ability to limit loss and it is a type of mental accounting that explains how previous 
good experiences by managers affect current decisions. On the other hand, investors with prior losses 
(seen as non-recoverable) may be less willing to take risks because they are not able to integrate the 
subsequent losses with the prior outcome.  
 
Strategic inconsistency arises when firms do not follow long term strategies designed both from the 
environment and the internal capabilities of firms. Without a clear strategy to guide all the departments 
and workers of a firm in the allocation of its resources, where consistent decisions are consecutively 
made, profit maximization becomes impossible to attain (Simon, 1991). Thus, in FDI locations all the 
decisions should be consistent with the broader strategy so that the firm can comply with 
maximization requirements. However, empirical studies show that even firms claiming a maximization 
objective do follow guidelines to make certain decisions that are inconsistent with optimization 
(Schwartz, 1998). 
 
Finally, expectations about the future may lead to overconfidence when the disregard of relevant 
information by managers leads to non-optimal FDI location decisions. Illusion of control or the 
tendency of managers to overestimate control over outcomes due to perceived better skills and abilities 
are examples of overconfidence (Hilton, 2003). Other potential explanations include the situation 
when managers have more information than they can handle and thus tend to be overconfident, and the 
fact that people tend to think they know observable facts better than is actually the case. A further 
reason is the existence of mistaken beliefs, illusory correlations, such as “less developed markets 
means higher and easier profitability”. Overconfidence may also be explained by a tendency of 
individuals to interpret information to confirm their pre-judgements or initial information 
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(confirmatory bias – Rabin, 1998). Malmendier and Tate (2005) present empirical evidence of 
overconfidence in the context of corporate investment. 
 
Those of extrinsic origin include anchoring, where traditional values and common historical and 
cultural practices condition present behaviour. Anchoring happens when social states are evaluated 
from a particular starting point and the choice of this point influences behavioural outcomes (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 2001, p. 26). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001, p. 1064) and Beckmann et al (2008) 
provide examples in investors’ decisions through the identification of a reference point for decision-
makers based on a common tongue and cultural background. This cultural influence can also originate 
from the specific historical practices of each firm that determine the concept of psychic distance 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Therefore, cultural variables should not be ignored given that they can 
influence decisions and play a significant role in determining FDI locations.  
 
Referring to the present, the availability of recent, dramatic or well publicized events is usually 
overestimated by individuals while the opposite characteristics, such as normality and regularity, leads 
to an underestimation of the relevance of events. This bias may alter the judgement of managers in 
FDI location decisions. These are situations in which the frequency of an event is judged by the 
facility with which its occurrence is remembered (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). When there is a 
huge stream of news about the attractiveness of some markets, managers’ attention is immediately 
transferred from other potential targets. China, for instance, is an example of a recent and well 
publicized opportunity that may induce a firm to ignore other potential markets. This availability may 
influence managers to follow the “herd” in FDI operations, through social learning and information 
externalities, as it happens in more efficient financial markets. Herding refers to any behaviour 
similarity brought about by social influences on an individual’s thoughts, feelings and actions, and 
transmitted through words or direct communication, observation of actions or of outcomes (Banerjee, 
1992 or Zwiebel, 1995). It means that the behaviour of individuals is based on both private 
information and the influence of others but that the later prevails over the first leading to similarity of 
decisions. Economic literature has presented empirical evidence of this type of behhaviour in FDI 
(e.g., Kinoshita and Mody, 2001) 
 
Finally, there are moral constraints, from family, friends, institutions, religion and everything that 
helps or influences individuals by shaping preferences that affect the behaviour of managers. A studied 
example is fairness, when managers act in conformity with informal but socially accepted rules or 
standards (Kahneman et al, 1986). 
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3 – Methodology 
 
The option for qualitative research is closely related with the attempt to better understand the 
determinants of FDI from a managerial perspective by considering the contextual variables 
surrounding a manager within the FDI decision-making process (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). It was 
implemented using the general interview guide approach, where a set of topics are outlined before 
being explored with each respondent through an interview. These topics served as a guide for all the 
themes covered in the interview and as a grid for the content analysis of the information collected 
(Patton, 1990). 
 
The use of in-depth interviewing with business managers, where respondents, in the course of an 
informal conversation, freely present, in their own words, all their thoughts, feelings, perceptions and 
experiences about a set of pre-determined issues, allows for a direct contact with those involved in FDI 
location decision and thus to have a deep understanding of the motivations and rationale behind those 
decisions or, in Patton’s words (1990, p. 278), to “…enter into the other person’s perspective”.  
 
The idea is to acknowledge the participant’s perspectives on FDI decisions and to analyze together 
both their objective and subjective views. Each respondent was also asked to explain the strategy of 
the firm, supposedly the basis for FDI decisions. In case the firm had a multi-business FDI operation, 
the interview focused on the core areas (more important in historical and/or volume terms).  
 
The interviews were made to managers in Portuguese firms with FDI operations from different 
industries: agriculture, manufacturing, energy, construction, financial and services. The common 
denominator is that all operations represent part of a firm’ production capabilities installed abroad. The 
reason is that the decision to invest abroad has to be very well thought and the uncertainty associated 
significantly greater than, for example, the opening of a mere representative office (in most cases these 
are only a support for exports). 
 
The number of operations abroad for this group total 112 and represent 11.8% of the total Portuguese 
FDI4 5 (Banco de Portugal, 2005). Each operation corresponds to a country location by a Portuguese 
investor. The sample is skewed for large firms in Portugal although these are, at best, medium size 
firms in international terms.  
                                                          
4 There were 8 divestments that are in the sample but no longer in the universe. However, the universe includes 
also locations without a productive component (e.g. representative offices) and affiliates of foreign-owned 
Portuguese firms. 
5 The interviewees were directly responsible for or participated in 76% of the total number of FDI decisions here 
considered and the actual management of the firms is the same or follows a similar internationalization strategy 
in 88% of operations. 
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Table 2 - Universe and sample of Portuguese outward FDI operations - 2004 
Type of Countries Universe % Sample Sample / Universe 
Developed 500 53 58 11.6 % 
Portuguese Speaking 268 28 27 10.0 % 
Other countries 180 19 27 15.0 % 
Total 948 100 112 11.8 % 
 
 
Data collection focused also on documentation directly supplied by interviewees and other available 
information in firms’ internet sites, such as annual reports, or national newspapers. Documentation 
analysis was used as a complement and as a source of validity for some of the information collected in 
the interviews.  
 
The collected information was organized by themes through a case description. A cross-case analysis 
was then performed leading to the results for each theme. Based on the interpretation of these results 
there was an identification of behavioural rules in each firm´s FDI decision making. These rules are 
the empirical evidence that indicate the existence of behavioural determinants of FDI. The identified 
behavioural rules together with the remaining collected information allow for the building of a 
database and to perform statistical tests on the Heiner model. 
 
Although qualitative research has its limits, namely its interpretive methodology and the direct 
involvement of the researcher in data collection, it can be addressed through actions to validate the 
information. As Marshall and Rossman (1995, p. 80) put it, “the participant’s perspective on the 
phenomenon of interest should unfold as the participant views it, not as the researcher views it”.  
 
Besides documentation analysis further steps were taken to deal with potential disadvantages of the 
use of interviews. There was a preparation via the form of four exploratory interviews and collection 
of information about each firm’s activity and FDI operations and, afterwards, a second contact with all 
the interviewees was made and eight answered further questions or requests for clarification.  
 
 
4 - Evidence of behavioural rules 
 
One of the aims of this paper is to find new determinants of FDI location decisions in order to enrich 
the FDI literature. Content analysis identified 175 situations in 112 FDI operations where 
behavioural rules may partially explain investment decisions abroad. Table 3 divides them as per the 
taxonomy described above. Given the impossibility of presenting all of them, the paper focus on four 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 12
cases where the difference between the neoclassical and the behavioural approaches is shown and 
evidence of several behavioural rules determining FDI is given. 
 
Table 3 – Identified Rules of Behaviour 
Intrinsic Extrinsic                        
           Type 
Time 
Rule of 
behaviour 
Nr. of 
cases 
Nr. of 
firms 
Rule of 
behaviour 
Nr. of 
cases 
Nr. of 
Firms 
Total  
cases 
Learning 10 7 Anchoring 43 12 Past 
Mental 
accounting 
20 4    
73 
   Cascading 4 4 
   Herding 23 14 
Strategic 
inconsistency 
13 7 Strategic 
inconsistency 
30 3 
   Inter-expert 
inconsistency 
17 17 
Present 
   Fairness 12 4 
 
 
 
99 
Future Overconfidence 3 3  3 
Total cases 
per type 
55 120 
Total  
locations 
175 
 
 
175 
 
 
Case 1: BES, a bank, and JM, a retailer, decided to invest in the Brazilian market in the second half of 
the 1990’s. The FDI literature provides two main possible explanations for these investments, cost 
efficiency and revenue. BES was already in Brazil, through an investment bank and other areas of 
business, when the decision to make a huge investment in a retail bank was implemented. Its manager 
refers to the exhaustion of the Portuguese market and thus the need for other markets to grow and to 
look for profitability as motives to invest abroad. He also stated that the group only invests abroad in 
businesses where it has a very good know-how in the domestic activity, like retail banking services. 
As reasons for the location in Brazil he refers to cultural variables such as a common tongue and a 
resident Portuguese community as a potential customer base. Therefore, according to FDI theory the 
aim was to increase revenue by having access to new clients in a different market with cultural 
liaisons. 
 
The behavioural approach recognizes the role of expected profitability and business growth as motifs 
to invest abroad. However, these were not exclusive of Brazil. There were other possible choices 
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where the growth potential could have been larger. Therefore, other reasons may help explain the 
specific choice of Brazil as a location to invest 
 
First, the presence of the group in the country since 1975, although in different business areas, seems 
to provide reassuring knowledge about the local market that was not available for other competing 
locations. This is implicitly confirmed by the interviewed manager: “We are in Brazil since 1975 
(insurance, investment banking and agriculture businesses) and, in 1997, decided to buy a bank with a 
retail network. But it did not work that well because it is a very peculiar market where foreigners are 
usually not successful. It is necessary to rely on local management because they know better the 
market”.  
 
However, despite the long business activity in Brazil and 20 years of accumulated knowledge of the 
market, the firm did not hire local managers to run its new business and relied on expatriates. 
Therefore, the investment of 1997 showed not only an inability to learn by the firm and its managers 
but also overconfidence on its own management to obtain different and better results than those of 
other banks, often with more international experience. The interviewed manager recognized that up to 
2004 only one foreign bank, ABN Amro, was able to be successful in the Brazilian market. 
 
Second, the simultaneous move of a few hundred Portuguese firms to Brazil motivated by the 
Portuguese government also explains this decision. In 1996, the Portuguese government decided that 
Brazil was the main objective for the Portuguese economy (NPI, 1997). The Portuguese prime-
minister at the time made several speeches and visits to this country, explicitly exhorting investors to 
move to that market. IPE (a state owned holding) participated as a shareholder in the investment made 
by a private firm. Furthermore, the year 2000 marked the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Pedro 
Àlvares Cabral to Brazil (following the 500th anniversary of Vasco da Gama’s journey to India), with 
widespread celebrations both in Portugal and in Brazil. Therefore, there was, on that period, a huge 
stream of news about the attractiveness and the opportunity of investing in Brazil. Portuguese firms 
were in the beginning of the process of internationalization (in terms of FDI) and cultural ties, 
common language, a huge market and a “push” from the government (through specific incentives such 
as interest free loans) explained the sudden interest in Brazil. According to Costa (2003) there were, in 
2001, 147 investments in Brazil made by 83 parent Portuguese companies and a large majority of 
these had invested after 1996. It means that almost one in three Portuguese firms with investments 
abroad in the end of the 1990’s chose the Brazilian market.  
 
In this process, judgements about FDI decisions were altered and other potential markets were clearly 
downplayed given the availability of evidence about Brazil. This availability of well publicized events 
was overestimated by some Portuguese managers when deciding to invest in Brazil in the period 
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between 1997 and 1999 and shows an easily recognizable herding phenomenon. The manager of BES 
confirms it: “we went with other firms such as PT, JM and Sonae”. FDI location decisions were 
influenced by an existing “unanimity” in the Portuguese managerial community towards the 
attractiveness of Brazil. This is true even when the required knowledge to invest seemed to be wrongly 
perceived. By looking at other firms moving to these markets the idea of a “target market” and “good 
businesses” is automatically established and discussed among managers. Those that do not “follow the 
herd” are considered “suspicious” by the market and their reputation may be in danger (Zwiebel, 
1995). There is clear evidence about this phenomenon. The manager of another firm, Modelo, stated: 
”We had a lot of cash to spend and the government had limited the number of licences to operate in 
Portugal. So, we decided to invest abroad. On the occasion Brazil and Latin America were the most 
fashionable locations and this (the investments) has a lot to do with fashions, as you know”.  
 
But the outcome of these investments was not the expected. From the sample of seven investments in 
Brazil, four (BES, CGD, JM and Modelo) of them were sold a few years later and, of the remaining, 
one (PT) is significantly less profitable for the investor than the Portuguese market. Only EDP 
registered, in 2004, a higher profitability than the consolidated value. Between 1997 and 2001 
Portuguese firms together invested 13,000 Million Euros in Brazil but divested half of this amount 
(Banco de Portugal, 2005). This indicates that a significant part of the investments were not successful 
and firms had to leave the market. The participation of the Portuguese state in a private enterprise was 
sold with a huge loss. BES and JM sold their investments with a lower than expected return. 
 
In Portuguese FDI there is also another market, the Spanish, where the herding phenomenon is easily 
recognizable and ten of the interviewed firms invested after 1990. From these, eight are less profitable 
(firms BES, Bial, BPI, CGD, EDP, Inapa, Vicaima and Modelo), one (Sogrape) was sold and in 
another one (Amorim) there is no available information in terms of profitability. The share of 
divestment over investment is even larger than in Brazil, 67%. This indicates that a significant part of 
the investments were not successful and firms had to leave the market. Another 170 firms followed the 
same path in this period, to an estimated total of 250 Portuguese firms in Spain (Pinheiro-Alves, 
2001).  
 
JM provides a very similar example. Its aim was also to increase revenue by having access to new 
clients in a different market. The growth potential was also not exclusive to Brazil, as its present 
experience in Poland shows, although the country presented an attractive market growth rate at the 
time. According to the management, the main reason to choose the market was the existing cultural 
relationship. But the firm also received some pressure from market analysts to invest abroad. The CEO 
of JM explicitly states it: “We went abroad because financial analysts did put a pressure on us by 
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‘threatening’ with a devaluation of our shares. But let me tell you that today I am very cautious with 
investment banks”.  
 
However, the behavioural approach provides two extra explanations: availability and herding, as 
above, and overconfidence from the CEO and main shareholder. He says: “I was marketing manager 
of Unilever in Brazil. I knew the market … if I didn’t I would have not committed so many mistakes” 
and then “It was a nonsense to go to Brazil. It is a very different market, with powerful competitors, 
both locals and foreigners, very strong and with a lot of money. We have no balance sheet for the 
market”. But the information about competitors was publicly available and the manager had 
knowledge of it. Therefore, an illusory perception about the abilities of the firm and of control over 
future events also explains the investment. The manager recognizes: “due to a stupid pride I was 
convinced that we would make it”. 
 
 
Case 2: A second example is given by PT, a telecommunications firm, and its two location decisions, 
Mozambique and East Timor. Again, the main explanation of FDI theory is the cultural relationship 
existing between Portugal and these two countries together with the perception of a superior know-
how by the investing firm and the need to serve clients in Mozambique. The behavioural approach 
provides several other explanations for the location decision that discard the traditional maximization 
aim. First, both operations are inconsistent with the firm’s strategy and thus are an obstacle for 
maximization. The internationalization strategy of PT is based on mobile communications and focused 
on Brazil and Africa. However, the firm is not a mobile operator in Mozambique and East Timor is in 
Asia. Second, the location decision was made after government instructions (the Portuguese state has a 
golden share in this firm) and with a sense of fairness. Both are Portuguese ex-colonies and very poor 
countries where the decolonization process was not correctly managed by Portugal. Therefore, there is 
a common will, in the Portuguese society, to help these countries and mainly the new independent 
state of East Timor.  
 
The interviewed manager refers that profitability is always the aim of investments abroad and “…in 
less developed countries the required return is higher and shorter – 5 years maximum - than in 
developed economies”. But both are small investments where the risk of losing money is limited 
namely in comparison with the huge revenue stream arising from the dominant position of the firm in 
the Portuguese market. PT enjoyed, for a large number of years, a comfortable position as a 
monopolist provider of telecommunication services. In 2004 it still had a dominant position in fixed 
and cable services. Therefore, the risk of losing money is cancelled out by the profits from its domestic 
activity. The existence of political objectives with a fairness component together with a house money 
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effect arising from the near monopolistic position of PT, provide a more complete explanation of the 
decision to invest in these countries than the neoclassical approach. 
 
The mental accounting effect seems to be common among Portuguese firms with investments abroad. 
From the sample of 112 operations, 20 may be partially explained by a firm’s previous gains. Two 
other firms – CGD and EDP - benefited from a monopoly situation in the Portuguese market similar to 
that of PT. CGD had the monopoly of banking for public servants in Portugal for more than 20 years 
while EDP has a monopolistic position in the energy market. They were able to absorb sufficient 
liquidity during the monopoly years that partially motivated and was later used to invest abroad. Table 
4 shows obtained profits since 1995 for the three firms. It may be seen that the return on assets of EDP 
and PT decreases significantly after 2000 due to the liberalization of both industries. CGD, on the 
other hand, presented a higher financial margin of 0.5% than the average of the Portuguese banking 
sector throughout the 1990’s. 
 
                  Table 4 – Consolidated Profits and ROA         (values in Million Euros) 
Profits 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
CGD 291.17 248.45 528.09 350.75 349.13 544.47 653.78 665.13 667.25 448.48
EDP n.a. n.a. n.a. 522.79 513.94 548.97 450.83 335.22 381.11 440.15
PT 180.83 273.95 349.64 441.1 494.68 540.32 307.39 391.05 240.23 500.12
ROA                     
CGD 0.85% 0.68% 1.28% 0.72% 0.63% 0.87% 0.98% 1.00% 0.90% 0.64%
EDP n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.22% 3.75% 3.69% 2.78% 1.85% 2.04% 1.95%
PT 4.31% 6.29% 7.01% 4.75% 5.81% 4.09% 1.74% 2.85% 1.77% 3.86%
Source: Annual reports. ROA = Profits / Total assets 
 
This is implicitly confirmed in the interviews. The manager of EDP stated that ”the market was 
mature for us and the firm generated excessive cash-flows for our needs in Portugal. Thus, we needed 
to invest abroad”. The same happened with CGD and PT. Moreover, the manager of Secil when 
explaining the internationalization policy of a direct competitor (not included in this study): ”they had 
a privileged situation during the privatization of the industry (in the 1990’s) because the state left 
them with a lot of money to invest abroad”. This shows how consecutive Portuguese governments 
“allowed” state owned firms to earn from their monopoly position and start the internationalization 
process before being privatized.  
 
The investments made by those three firms, and by Salvador Caetano (see case 4), were generally less 
profitable than the earnings in the home market. Although one cannot be sure that managers accepted a 
higher risk when the investments were decided, it is clear that they have been not successful for a long 
time. CGD invested in Spain in 1991 and it kept on having losses for a decade (Pinheiro-Alves, 2001). 
EDP invested in Brazil in 1997 and, although is having profits now, the new management hired in 
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2002 decided to focus on the Spanish market while Brazil is still “running” but in an autonomous and 
self-financing way. PT invested in Brazil in 1998 and, despite the accumulated losses (table 5)6, 
obtained a commercial success and this is a possible explanation to keep the investment. But the 
motivation for these firms to maintain the investments abroad despite the bad financial results, and 
besides political considerations (the Portuguese government still has a word in the strategy of these 
firms), can be understood if it is realized that the three firms have shown systematic consolidated 
profits in the end of each year. The profits from the activity in Portugal, in a way similar to tax 
revenue for the state due to their monopolistic component, have been financing losses in the larger and 
“strategic” FDI investments made by these firms, and managers are, in fact, operating through a 
mental accounting rule. This is a systematic and recurrent rule because bad financial results abroad are 
kept and “hidden” year after year by domestic profits.  
 
Table 5 – Net income of the main strategic investments abroad 
 Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
CGD Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.16 1.84 0.4 -11.7 
EDP Brazil n.a. n.a -24.9 7.25 79.9 -20.2 -86.3 48.1 
PT Brazil - 17.00 9.42 122.1 -519.0 -34.2 -9.88 -59.2 
Values in Million euros 
 
 
Case 3: A similar example is given by CGD, a state-owned bank. The investments in China and Spain 
are justified by growth potential and the aim of obtaining profits. Geographical proximity and 
willingness to serve clients are location reasons. But the interview reveals other important reasons. In 
the case of Spain the interviewee refers to several additional reasons: “…to be in a competitive market 
and Spain is a natural market for us due to geographical proximity. Furthermore, there is a strong 
presence of Spanish banks in Portugal and our competitiveness also depends on being in Spain”. 
Although these are valid reasons, and recognized by FDI theory, it should be noted that CGD has a 
market share of less than 1% in the Spanish market, and is mainly located near the border with 
Portugal. The biggest Spanish bank, on the other hand, is larger than the entire Portuguese market and 
has a share of 20% despite informal “warnings” by successive Portuguese governments against an 
excessive Spanish presence (Pinheiro-Alves, 2001). Therefore, political reasons, namely government 
instructions, also help to explain the investment in Spain. The fear of an “invasion” of Portugal by 
Spanish firms was counterbalanced through government instructions and appeals for Portuguese 
investors to go to Spain (triggering the herding phenomenon described above). In both cases a house 
money effect can also be observed given the monopoly position enjoyed by CGD for many years and 
the consequent access to a cheaper funding.  
 
                                                          
6 In the annual report of 2002 PT presented ”…an improvement in the return of the investment in Brazil” as one 
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The CGD group also has a branch in Zuhai, near Macau, since 1991. This branch can only operate in 
foreign currency and thus is “…relatively inactive” in the words of the interviewee. But its banking 
operations could be booked in other affiliates of the group, including Macao, and thus the branch was 
unnecessary. Moreover, it was inconsistent with the strategy of the firm up to 2003, when China was 
firstly considered as a target market. For more than 13 years capital was invested in the branch, 
without return, and the firm was not able to learn and change the situation. Therefore, FDI is better 
explained by the political need to maintain a Portuguese presence in the region and to strengthen a 
position in Macao, which was expected to become a special area of China after 1999 and by cultural 
reasons, specifically the history of the group, for decades the issuing entity of currency in Macao. 
 
Cultural and historical (of the firm) variables are also very relevant for FDI decisions by Portuguese 
firms, although neoclassical economics seldom recognizes it. There is cultural influence when 
investments are attracted by countries that communicate in the investor’s native tongue and have a 
similar cultural background. Almost one third (35 in 112) of the studied investments are located in 
Portuguese speaking countries and a further 3 also are explained by cultural or historical reasons. 
Thus, it seems that this type of anchoring is relevant for decision makers because the decision to invest 
abroad was evaluated from a particular starting point, cultural linkages, and the choice of this point 
influenced behavioural outcomes (investment locations). 
  
The answers obtained in the interviews confirm this statement. Seven firms explicitly stated that 
cultural variables were determinant for investment location and a further three also referred to their 
relevance. Moreover, six firms present historical (of the firm) reasons to be present in a market. The 
manager of Modelo, a retailer, explained the investment in Brazil in this way: ”We were in Brazil 
since 1989 through a partnership (in an industrial area). So, when we decided to invest there we 
already knew the market. The cultural aspect and the special affinity of the CEO to the country were 
decisive in the choice of Brazil”. The manager of EDP: “Brazil was a natural market for us due to the 
opportunity (liberalization of the Brazilian market) and cultural reasons”. 
 
But in most cases, cultural and historically driven FDI has not good results and show that decisions 
mainly based on these variables are not rational, in the neoclassical sense, because they are very likely 
to prevent profit maximization.. The outcome is inferior when compared with consolidated data. This 
is presented in table 6 for several countries. The information concerns 2004 when the majority of 
operations were running for some years and thus had sufficient time to become profitable. All together 
there are 16 locations with lower and 11 with higher return than consolidated accounts.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of its main challenges (PT, annual report 2002, p. 23). But until 2004 with no success. 
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Table 6 – Relative performance of FDI in Portuguese speaking countries 
Country Consolidated Angola Brazil Cape Guinea Macao Mozambique S. Tomé Timor
Firm ROA (2004)     Verde  Bissau     Principe   
BES 0.60% Higher Lower - - Lower - - - 
BPI 0.80% Higher - - - - Higher - - 
CGD 0.64% - 
Lower
Lower - Lower Higher n.a. 
Highe
r 
EDP 1.95% - 
Highe
r Lower - n.a. - - - 
JM 4,14% - Lower - - - - - - 
Mota 1.70% Higher - - - - Higher - - 
PT 3.86% n.a. Lower n.a. Lower n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SC 1.40% Lower - Higher Lower - Lower - - 
Secil 7.83% Lower - Lower - - - - - 
Modelo 5,15% - Lower - - - - - - 
BCP 0.72% Lower 
- 
- - 
Highe
r Higher - - 
 
 
Case 4: A final example is Salvador Caetano, a car producer and assembler, where investments in the 
United Kingdom and Mozambique are justified by the need to channel domestic production and 
market size, in the first case, and cultural affinity and superior know-how in the second. However, 
both investments have peculiar stories. The investment in the UK started in 1984 when a local 
representative “convinced” the firm to invest in the country but the results were not satisfactory: “The 
level of profits was not good and we had several years of losses due to the negative impact of tourism 
and the difficulties of tour operators. These invested in used buses and destroyed the market for new 
ones”. In 1998 the firm made a new investment in the UK to produce coaches with a local partner. But 
despite the agreement, the joint venture was broken because the partner decided to joint venture with 
other firms. Again, market reasons explained the failure: “…we lost a lot of money due to market 
context, namely the demand for coaches that changed after the new investment was made”. Finally, in 
2004 the firm invested again in the production of buses in Portugal to export to the UK and closed the 
production of coaches by transforming it in a car repairing business. The manager justifies the 
continuing investment in the UK with the possibility of channelling Portuguese production. But the 
fact is that the firm has been investing continuously since 1984 without profiting from it and was not 
able to learn from the different attempts to change the business. This investment has been financed 
mainly with domestic cash-flows and thus is also justified by the expected possibility to recover 
previous losses and the ability to limit them. Despite the accumulated loss in the UK, the firm is 
earning sufficient money in Portugal to cover it. Thus, home gains (the house money effect) affect the 
decision to invest abroad by limiting the risk.   
  
In Mozambique there was an agreement with the local government where, informally, access to the 
market was “exchanged” for the superior know-how of Salvador Caetano in assembling buses. But, 
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according to the interviewee, the local government broke its promises and, despite the previous 
experience in the UK, there was no formal guarantee in favour of the firm as a way of prevention. The 
trust is explained by an attitude of fairness towards a very poor country. “We wanted to help the 
development of Mozambique and agreed, with the state as a partner, to install a factory to produce 
components and assemble buses. But the government, instead of giving some type of protection to the 
industry, decided to raise tariffs for the import of components and to eliminate tariffs for the import of 
buses. Thus, the factory is now inactive because there are no necessary conditions to develop any type 
of business. And we are very disappointed. It seems that they do not want our help”.  
 
This manager reflects a common feeling in Portugal about the need to invest in the ex-colonies and 
help them to develop, and confirms that moral influences also have a specific role in economic 
decisions (Etzioni, 1988). This may explain why the firm invested in good faith, without any formal 
guarantee, believing that the Mozambican government, as a shareholder, would support the operation. 
There are a total of 12 examples in the firms surveyed, namely those closely related with the 
Portuguese policy of helping former colonies. This policy has been partly implemented through state-
owned firms or public firms where the government still has influence.  
 
The above presented cases, where FDI location decisions are explained by behavioural rules, have as a 
consequence no aim or ability to maximize. The aim for profitability is always there but maximization 
is never an issue and it is impossible to reach due to the use of behavioural rules. Therefore, 
behavioural rules help in explaining FDI location decisions in a complementary way to mainstream 
economics. Annex 1 compares the neoclassical and behavioural approaches and underlines the more 
complete picture provided by the latter one. In all cases the determinants of the location decision 
presented in bold are not usually recognized by the neoclassical approach although they are now 
common in behavioural finance.  
 
 
5 – The role of uncertainty 
 
The Competence-Difficulty (C-D) model, proposed by Heiner (1983, 1985, 1989), confronts the 
“competence” of an agent with the “difficulty” in selecting most preferred alternatives in a decision-
making process. An existing gap between competence and difficulty means that agents face 
uncertainty about how to use information in selecting an option from several potential alternatives. 
Therefore, uncertainty exposes the limits of any agent in any selection process. This is a different 
approach from neoclassical economics where it is assumed “…for the purpose of theoretical 
explanation that there is no gap between an agent’s competence and the difficulty of the decision 
problem to be solved …” (Heiner, 1983, p. 562).  
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The Heiner model presents two types of variables, environmental and perceptual. The first represents 
environmental (complexity-stability) influences from the past, present and future, in economic, legal, 
political or cultural terms, surrounding the decisions made by firms while the second refers to how 
managers perceive the connection between their behaviour and the environment, that is, how they 
react to information. The second variable includes both the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of 
individuals. The two together determine the gap between capacity and difficulty, that is, the degree of 
uncertainty (U). The more complex is the environment or the less reliable are the perceptions of 
managers the greater is the C-D gap and the uncertainty in the decision making process.  
 
D - C = U, with C ≤ D            (1) 
 
It is the existence of uncertainty that explains constrained behaviour or behavioural regularities. 
Greater uncertainty reduces the reliability of the decisions-making process and leads managers to rely 
on behavioural rules when, e.g., opting for collecting further information about a potential location to 
invest. If there was no uncertainty, the managers would know if the new information was necessary or 
if the investment operation was profitable. However, when facing uncertainty managers complement 
the rational part of the decision-making process (collecting information about potential markets) with a 
behavioural component to reach a final decision about the location of the investment. The higher the 
uncertainty the more the manager simplifies the decision-making process by relying on behavioural 
rules. In this way uncertainty becomes the source of the regularities observed in agents’ behaviour 
while in neoclassical economics predictable behaviour arises from the will to maximize. 
 
Behavioural rules are not explained by some occasional failures but represent a gap in the C-D Model 
where the degree of uncertainty is significant. They are no mere bounding constraints but behavioural 
regularities where decision making may be far away from what is deemed to be rational in a 
neoclassical sense. 
 
A behavioural approach considers FDI decisions as a process of different steps starting with the 
decision to invest abroad and ending in the chosen location. This may take several months or years 
where different participants take part in assessing the firm’s internal capacity in terms of financing, 
human resources or inputs, and make many small and big decisions related to information collection, 
so that several alternatives may be established, and a risk and financial analysis provided to understand 
the possible impact of an FDI operation on the value of the firm. 
 
Each FDI related decision is supposed to be in accordance with the strategy of the firm and deals with 
potential sources of information on costs, revenue and risk. But the access to these sources has a 
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component of uncertainty. Due to uncertainty investors do not know if the selection of new 
information improves their performance. The response to potential information depends both on the 
environment and on managers´ perceptions. Perceptions on information may be of the intrinsic (to the 
decision maker) or extrinsic (from the environment) type and may lead to bounded rationality (Simon, 
1955), where costs, management time and abilities are constraints, or to the use of simplifying 
strategies in recurrent situations (rules of behaviour). A simple development of the Heiner model 
explicitly emphasizes the intrinsic and extrinsic components of managerial perception and 
complements the relevance given by the model to environmental variables. Heiner refers to it (1983, p. 
575) but not in a testable way. But others such as Frey and Eichenberger (2001) see it as essential to 
explain behaviour. From equation (1): 
 
If           D > C        =»           U > 0 
If           D = C        =»           U = 0  
 
When there is no uncertainty each new decision related with the FDI operation is on the right path 
towards maximization and agents behave as predicted by the neoclassical model (Heiner, 1983, p. 
565). This is the usual assumption of neoclassical models where agents use information perfectly by 
selecting actions that maximize the expected utility based on available information. However, a 
decision to invest abroad is always uncertain and in many situations there is also uncertainty about 
how to use information. An extemporaneous decision to collect further information about risk 
characteristics of a country, for example, may be useless and may have a negative influence on a 
future location decision. 
 
Considering that uncertainty provokes bounded behaviour (B) and the use of behavioural rules (A), 
and that both affect competence 
 
U = B + Ae + Ai         (2) 
 
where A is divided into the extrinsic (Ae) and intrinsic (Ai) components of behavioural rules. As long 
as  
 
C < D      =»  U = B + Ae + Ai > 0      (3) 
 
Therefore, if there is bounded rationality or “anomalous” behaviour in FDI location decisions 
maximization cannot be achieved. The farther from zero they are the larger is the gap between the 
competence in a FDI location decision and the difficulty to implement it. This is valid for each 
decision or response to potential information within the FDI process. Thus, the model also applies to 
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all the internal decisions related with a FDI operation made by the employees of the firm. The central 
hypothesis of the Heiner model results from equation (3): Assuming a fixed B, the higher the 
uncertainty the higher is the reliance of investors (or any other agents) on behavioural rules of intrinsic 
(Ai) and extrinsic (Ae) nature.  
 
A predicted consequence of the model is that firms invest more where there is less uncertainty. If it is 
confirmed it indicates the relevance of uncertainty in decision-making and the need of a behavioural 
approach to complement neoclassical theory. The prediction of the model seems to be valid in the case 
of Portuguese FDI because its operations are concentrated in developed (55%) and in Portuguese 
speaking countries (24%). In both cases uncertainty may be considered as inferior to most of the 
alternative locations (table 7). 
 
Table 7 – Portuguese FDI abroad (1996-2004) 
Number of operations FDI flows 
Net value 
 
Number % of total Value 
(Million  euros) 
% of total 
OECD countries 500 52.7 21.268 55.8 
Portuguese-
speaking 
268 28.2 9.219 24.1 
Other countries 180 19.1 7.704 20.1 
Banco de Portugal (2005) 
 
But in order to test the Heiner model it is necessary first to define a measure for behavioural rules and 
uncertainty7. The expected result of the test is a confirmation of a positive and significant relationship 
between uncertainty and the use of behavioural rules. The collected information in the interviews and 
documentation analysis allows the building of a database with a total of 112 observations representing 
4.6% of Portuguese firms with FDI and 11.8% of FDI operations abroad (Banco de Portugal, 2005). 
Only 68 FDI operations register the existence of rules of behaviour. It should be noted that, to test the 
model, behavioural rules need to be directly related to the chosen location. Therefore, tests only 
include 160 of the 175 rules because the remaining 15 are related with the decision making process 
and cannot be allocated to a specific FDI operation.  
 
A first variable is called “Numbehav” and is formed from the number of rules of behaviour detected 
for each firm and for each FDI operation. In what concerns uncertainty, the most obvious way to 
measure it is sovereign risk ratings (proxy 1: “Countryrating”) as presented by the country historical 
ratings of Standard&Poor’s for long term debt in local currency (where A means lower, B intermediate 
and C higher risk). Since these are not available for all cases, and given that the level of development 
                                                          
7 Annex 2 describes the variables. 
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is usually (by rating firms) recognized to be negatively correlated with risk, they are replaced, when 
absent, by the measure of development used by the World Bank. This is not a perfect proxy because 
ratings strictly represent the ability of the country to pay its sovereign debt in local currency by 
considering political, economic and financial risks while the Heiner model refers to uncertainty as a 
whole and not only the risk component. However, the inclusion of these different risks indicates that 
the “known unknowns” of uncertainty that are not represented by a probability are somehow 
considered. Only the “unknown unknowns” are missing. 
 
Table 8 – Frequencies of Behavioural rules per type of country 
Groups of countryrating Rules of behaviour Nr. of FDI operations 
Rating A (low uncertainty) 38 25 
Rating B (medium uncertainty) 45 17 
Rating C (high uncertainty) 77 26 
Not allocated 15 - 
     Total 175 68 
 
A second proxy is to define uncertainty by underlining the cultural connections of Portugal. Thus a 
second variable called “Typeofcountry” is also considered where Portuguese speaking countries are 
regarded as having more uncertainty than OECD countries, to which Portugal is more integrated in 
economic and political terms, and less uncertainty than the remaining countries with no special 
connections with Portugal. 
 
Different proxies to uncertainty may arise from the level of internationalization of each firm. The 
longer a firm is exposed to foreign markets the higher should be the experience and thus the lower the 
uncertainty when choosing a new market to invest. Therefore, it can be considered that a longer 
presence abroad allows for an improvement in the knowledge of how to operate in unfamiliar 
environments and thus a decrease in uncertainty when the next location decision is made. In this sense, 
uncertainty is expected to decrease with the number of external markets where the firm is active 
(proxy 3: “Numbmarkets”) and with the number of years abroad every time a decision to make a FDI 
is made (proxy 4: “Numbyears”). The lower is the number of markets and the number of years abroad 
the lower is the experience accumulated by the firm and the higher should be the uncertainty faced by 
managers.  
 
The four proxies allow us to consider different perspectives in terms of measurement of variables in 
the Heiner model. But they do not represent the perceptions of individual managers in terms of 
uncertainty and this would be the ideal measure in theoretical terms. From the above proxy 2 may be 
the one that is nearer the perceptions of respondents that mention the advantage of better knowing 
Portuguese-speaking countries. For example, the manager of Secil says when justifying the presence in 
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Angola and Cape Verde: “Our Irish partners do not understand the advantage of having a close 
cultural relationship with these countries”. 
 
After addressing the independence of observations and the randomness of the sample selection, several 
statistical tests are performed in the SPSS software, version 12 (Norusis, 2003). These tests are 
expected to reveal how strong is and the direction of the relationship between the two variables 
(uncertainty and behavioural rules). Their use is explained by the characteristics of the available 
information. The variables are mostly nominal or ranks, the size of the sample is not very large and the 
assumption of a normal distribution in the population is prevented by the one sample Kolgomorov-
Smirnov and other normality tests.  
 
To test the Heiner model it is implicitly assumed that the available information for each case with 
detected rules of behaviour was collected. The following null and alternative hypotheses apply: 
 
H0: There is no association between uncertainty and rules of behaviour 
H1: There is an association 
 
A first issue is that of the linearity in the relationship between uncertainty and behavioural rules. 
Scatter plots show a very weak linear relationship between them and thus linear tests are not 
appropriate for the data. But the null hypothesis that uncertainty and rules of behaviour are 
independent can be checked by using the chi-square statistic. All tests based on the chi-square 
calculate the difference between the observed and expected values and require each cell to have an 
expected value greater than 1 and more than 80% of the cells to have a value greater than 5 (Norusis, 
2003, p. 167). This means that data has to be aggregated for the number of behavioural rules. 
“Numbehav” is thus grouped by 0, 1 and 2 or more behavioural rules. Table 9 shows that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a significance level of 1% meaning that in fewer than 1 sample in 100 the 
two variables would be independent8. 
 
Several measures of association and direction are also tested in order to understand how strongly the 
two variables are related. Table 10 presents the results for “countryrating” and “Typeofcountry” as 
proxies to uncertainty. Given the weak linearity existing between variables and their characteristics 
(nominal and scale) tests are made both for nominal and ordinal data. The latter are usually considered 
more reliable than tests based simply on nominal variables. These tests generally require feeble 
assumptions and only in some cases outliers or ties in the data need to be considered. 
 
                                                          
8 The outcome is robust and it does not change qualitatively if the grouping is 0, 1 and 2, and 3 or more rules. 
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Symmetric measures indicate a significant and fairly strong relationship between both proxies of 
uncertainty and “Numbehav”. The results are stronger for ordinal measures where the positive or 
negative sign of the association is also considered. 
 
        Table 9 – Independence tests            
  Countryrating and Numbehav 
Independence Tests Value DFr N Significance 
Pearson chi-square 30.2 4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood Ratio 34.9 4 112 0.000 *** 
          
  Typeofcountry and Numbehav 
Independence Tests Value DFr N Significance 
Pearson chi-square  4 112 0.000 *** 
Likelihood Ratio  4 112 0.000 *** 
          
*** Significant at a 1% level 
 
 
Given that symmetric measures do not consider dependent and independent variables (nominal and 
ordinal) asymmetric measures are also performed. Their results show a stronger relationship for 
ordinal measures than for nominal ones and in all cases the values are significant at a 1% level.  
 
        Table 10 – Association Tests: Uncertainty and behavioural rules (“Numbehav”) 
Situation 1 Value N Signific. Value N Signific. 
 Uncertainty proxy: Countryrating    Typeofcountry   
Symmetric         
Cramer' V (1) 0.367 112 0.000 *** 0.496 112 0.000 *** 
Contingency coef. (1) 0.461 112 0.000 *** 0.574 112 0.000 *** 
Kendall's tau-b 0.467 112 0.000 *** 0.273 112 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.640 112 0.000 *** 0.344 112 0.000 *** 
           
Directional          
Lambda 0.118 112 0.009 *** 0.221 112 0.009 *** 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.089 112 0.000 *** 0.169 112 0.000 *** 
Somers' d 0.515 112 0.000 *** 0.280 112 0.000 *** 
Eta square 0.544 112 - 0.685 112 - 
*** Significant at a 1% level 
(1) Requires aggregated data in “Numbehav” because they are based on the chi-square 
 
 
Measures based in proportional reduction in error (Lambda and Goodman measure the reduction in the 
error to predict the dependent variable through the independent one) present very low values but this is 
explained by the use of more disaggregated data in comparison with the remaining nominal measures 
which are based on the chi-square distribution (and thus require aggregation)9. 
                                                          
9 If the variable “Numbehav” is aggregated for these two tests, values would be 0,265 and 0,143 with a better 
level of significance for Lambda. 
 27
 
The two other proxies for uncertainty, “numbyears” and “numbmarkets”, were tested without 
meaningful results (Annex 3, table 1). It should be noted that these proxies were based on the 
assumption that higher experience would reduce the use of rules of behaviour. But, as the behavioural 
approach states, it might be that these rules change with experience but are not necessarily reduced 
after a determined point. 
 
Table 11 – Type of behavioural rules in the Heiner model 
Countryrating and Numbehav (Sit. 1)
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance
Independence
Pearson Chi-sqaure 23.5 4 112 0.000 *** 22.4 4 112 0.000 ***
Likelihood ration 26.4 4 112 0.000 *** 21.6 4 112 0.000 ***
Symmetric
Cramer' V 0.324 - 112 0.000 *** 0.317 - 112 0.000 ***
Contingency coef. 0.417 - 112 0.000 *** 0.409 - 112 0.000 ***
Kendall's tau-b 0.396 112 0.000 *** 0.353 112 0.000 ***
Gamma 0.568 - 112 0.000 *** 0.560 - 112 0.000 ***
- -
Directional
Lambda 0.150 - 112 0.017 ** 0.083 - 112 0.548
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.094 - 112 0.000 *** 0.141 - 112 0.000 ***
Somers' d 0.418 - 112 0.000 *** 0.313 - 112 0.000 ***
Eta square 0.466 - 112 0.389 112
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
Countryrating and Numbehav (Sit. 1)
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance
Independence
Pearson Chi-sqaure 11.8 4 112 0.018 ** 40.2 4 112 0.000 ***
Likelihood ration 11.4 4 112 0.022 ** 43.8 4 112 0.000 ***
Symmetric
Cramer' V 0.284 - 112 0.006 *** 0.446 - 112 0.000 ***
Contingency coef. 0.373 - 112 0.006 *** 0.533 - 112 0.000 ***
Kendall's tau-b 0.276 112 0.001 *** 0.503 112 0.000 ***
Gamma 0.421 - 112 0.001 *** 0.711 - 112 0.000 ***
- -
Directional
Lambda - - 112 (1) 0.200 - 112 0.017 **
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.041 - 112 0.032 ** 0,206 - 112 0.000 ***
Somers' d 0.282 - 112 0.001 *** 0.491 - 112 0.000 ***
Eta square 0.304 - 112 0.586 112
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
(1) Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
Rules Originated in the Present Rules Originated in the Past
Rules of Extrinsic Origin Rules of Intrinsic Origin
 
 
 
The results for “Countryrating” and “Typeofcountry” confirm the existence of a relationship between 
uncertainty and the number of behavioural rules as predicted by the Heiner model. Most of the values 
are fairly strong and all measures indicate positive direction. The Eta coefficient, for example, shows 
that “countryrating” explains 54%, and “Typeofcountry” 68%, of the variability in “Numbehav”.  
 
However, there is no guarantee that behavioural rules are caused by higher uncertainty. Other reasons 
may explain this positive relationship and thus it is useful to analyse if it is spurious, that is, if it is 
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explained by a third or a group of other variables connecting both uncertainty and rules of behaviour. 
Statistical tests allow us to include control variables. Table 2 in Annex 3 shows the outcome when four 
control variables (described in Annex 2) are considered: “Decision”, “Respondents”, “Objective” and 
“Previlevel”. For all the four control variables the association between uncertainty (“Countryrating”) 
and behavioural rules is still valid except for proportional reduction in error measures due to the level 
of disaggregation and the small number of observations. 
 
A further issue is to assess the individual relevance of each type of behavioural rule. There is enough 
information for extrinsic and intrinsic behavioural rules (114 and 46, respectively) and for those 
related with the past (73) and the present (84) in the time span. The testing of the model is made by 
considering both “Countryrating” (Table 11) and “TypeofCountry” (annex 3, table 3) as the proxy for 
uncertainty. Statistical tests show all types not to contradict the Heiner model, except rules of intrinsic 
nature in the second proxy where the results are very weak. In the first proxy, rules originated in the 
past – anchoring, learning and mental accounting - are the ones presenting a stronger relationship with 
uncertainty.  
 
 
6 – Conclusions  
 
Behavioural rules are new determinants of FDI location decisions that complement the two main 
motives presented by economic literature, revenue increase and cost efficiency considerations. These 
are manager and firm-level determinants of a special kind because they do not arise from the reason 
behind the decision to re-locate production, such as market, asset or efficiency-seeking, but from the 
decision making process itself. 
 
The above presented evidence supplies a diversified set of new explanations for FDI location decisions 
and shows that Portuguese managers follow simplifying strategies when making them. There were 
several situations where managers repeated the same behaviour in a consecutive way or kept 
unchanged non-maximizing decisions for a long period. The behavioural approach was able to help 
explain 55% of FDI location decisions made by the Portuguese firms included in the study.  
 
Based on the available observations and performed tests, and given the association existing between 
the level of uncertainty and the number of behavioural rules detected in Portuguese firms, the Heiner 
model can be regarded as suitable to study Portuguese FDI operations. The model predicts that 
managers rely on actions which are adaptable to relatively recurrent situations while ignoring actions 
which are appropriate in unusual circumstances. Given this learning “failure”, heuristics are needed for 
a better prediction of behaviour in FDI decisions. Economic theory should not only understand why 
 29
firms invest abroad but also how are these decisions made. Both perspectives are needed and, contrary 
to neoclassical theory, the model is able to include them. Therefore, the model seems a good tool to 
predict managers’ behaviour in FDI location decisions. 
 
Among the identified types of regularities those originated in the past and of extrinsic nature seem to 
have a more significant role in the behaviour of Portuguese firms when making FDI decisions. But 
those of intrinsic nature and originated in the present are also valid. Although heuristics indicate that 
agents are not able to learn from past experiences in all situations and thus cannot improve indefinitely 
their behaviour towards optimality, the knowledge about behaviour rules might help managers 
improving their performance by considering and reviewing their use.  
 
Finally, the findings and consequences presented above rely on some features that may be improved in 
future work. The enlargement of the database, by the inclusion of other countries and large TNC, 
would allow the strengthening of these results. Moreover, the behavioural approach needs to be 
deepened through a better understanding of the role of contextual issues such as the influence of each 
firm’s culture and history and the individual cognitive characteristics of managers, including cultural 
and moral variables. This suggests the existence of further determinants for country locations in FDI 
operations.   
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Annex 1 – Neoclassical and behavioural approaches in FDI location decisions 
 
Firm FDI theory Behavioural approach 
BES: Brazil - Growth potential 
- Cultural affinity 
- Growth potential 
- Cultural anchoring 
- History of the firm 
- Availability and herding 
- Overconfidence  
- Learning inability 
CGD: China - Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Learning inability 
CGD: Spain - Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- To compete with Spanish banks 
- Geographical proximity 
- To serve clients 
- To compete with Spanish banks 
- Availability and herding 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
JM: Brazil - Cultural affinity 
- Market growth rate 
- Market growth rate  
- Availability and herding 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Overconfidence 
PT: East Timor - Cultural affinity 
- Superior know-how 
- Superior know-how  
- Cultural anchoring 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
- Fairness 
PT: Mozambique - Cultural affinity 
- Superior know-how 
- To serve clients 
- Superior know-how  
- To serve clients  
- Cultural anchoring 
- Strategic inconsistency 
- Mental accounting 
- Fairness 
SC: Mozambique - Cultural affinity 
- Superior know-how 
- Superior know-how 
- Cultural anchoring 
- Fairness 
SC: United Kingdom - To channel domestic production 
- Market size 
- To channel domestic production 
- Market size 
- Mental accounting 
- Learning inability 
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Annex 2 – Description of variables for statistical tests 
 
 
Rules of behaviour 
 
Numbehav – Number of behavioural rules. When aggregated information is required tests are made 
for two different groupings so that their robustness can be checked. The first considers three sets of 
country locations with zero rules, 1 rule or 2 rules or more. The second considers zero rules, 1 or 2 
rules, and 3 rules or more.  
 
 
Uncertainty  
 
At the level of the FDI operation: 
 
Proxy 1: Countryrating – Rating of the country where FDI is located. It varies from rating A, lower 
uncertainty (risk), to C, higher uncertainty (risk). 
 
Proxy 2: Typeofcountry – Divided by: Countries with a similar law and political and economic 
institutions (OECD and EU) where there is less uncertainty; countries with a common tongue and past 
with Portugal; remaining countries, with more uncertainty.  
 
Proxy 3: Numbmarkets – Number of external markets where the firm is present when the next FDI 
location decision is made. A higher number corresponds to lower uncertainty. 
 
Proxy 4: Numbyears – Number of years abroad when the next FDI location decision is made. A 
higher number corresponds to lower uncertainty 
 
 
Control variables 
 
Decision – Influence of shareholders in decision-making. The shareholder structure did not 
significantly change in the past for the considered firms. This is divided in 4 categories: Individual 
decisions with more than 5% and less than 50% or more than 50%. And group decisions when the firm 
is public or when the Portuguese government has a role. 
 
Respondents – Influence of respondents divided in 3 categories: CEO’s, Other members of the board 
and Middle managers. 
 
Objective – Stated goals of the firm divided in 5 categories: Maximization, Minimum profitability, 
Other quantitative objective, Qualitative objectives and at least two of the last three.   
 
Previlevel - Previous level of internationalization based on 2 indicators for each firm: Number of 
years abroad and number of markets where a firm is present when each FDI decision is made. This 
variable is classified in 3 different categories: 
a) Lower level (of internationalization): when the firm only has investments abroad less than 5 years 
old 
b) Medium level: when the firm has FDI for 5 or more years but it is present in less than 5 countries 
c) Higher level: when the firm has FDI for 5 or more years and it is present in more than 5 countries 
The number 5 is arbitrary in this classification although is confirmed in some verbal statements by 
interviewees. For example, the manager of firm 8 refers that “a firm needs at least 5 years to become 
profitable”. 
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Annex 3  
  
Table 1 - Measures of association and direction 
Numbyears/Numbmarkets and Numbehav 
 
 
Statistical Tests Value N Signific. Value N Signific. 
 Uncertainty proxy: Numbyears     Numbmarkets   
Symmetric         
Kendall's tau-b 0.031 107 0.690 -0.057 107 0.466 
Gamma 0.036 107 0.690 -0.069 107 0.466 
           
Directional          
Lambda 0.239 107 0.007 *** 0.179 107 0.025 ** 
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.239 107 0.293 0.095 107 0.861 
Somers' d 0.027 107 0.690 -0.052 107 0.466 
Eta square 0.447 107 - 0.303 107 - 
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** significant at a 5% level; 
 
 
Cramer´s v and contingency coefficient are not feasible because they are based on the chi-square distribution and 
the number of observations is insufficient 
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Table 2 – “Countryrating” and Behavioural Rules - Tests for Control Variables 
 
 
Table 2a: Decision 
Control variable: Decision
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =112
Symmetric
Kendall's tau-b 0.320 37 0.013 ** 0.583 13 0.004 *** 0.432 25 0.037 ** 0.541 37 0.000 ***
Gamma 0.459 37 0.013 ** 0.857 13 0.004 *** 0.818 25 0.037 ** 0.682 37 0.000 ***
Asymmetric
Lambda 0.174 37 0.278 0.286 13 0.124 0.400 25 0.029 ** 0.179 37 0.016 **
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.071 37 0.246 0.289 13 0.129 0.300 25 0.027 ** 0.127 37 0.004 ***
Somers' d 0.329 37 0.013 ** 0.750 13 0.004 *** 0.519 25 0.037 ** 0.608 37 0.000 ***
Eta 0.342 37 0.911 13 0.548 25 0.620 37
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
1 - Individual more than 50% 2 - Individual more than 5% 3 - Group in public firm 4 - Group with State role
 
 
 
Table 2b: Respondents 
Control variable: Respondent
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =112
Symmetric
Kendall's tau-b 0.617 5 0.025 ** 0.517 47 0.000 *** 0.465 60 0.000 ***
Gamma 1.000 5 0.025 ** 0.742 47 0.000 *** 0.619 60 0.000 ***
Asymmetric
Lambda 0 - (1) 0.321 47 0.003 *** 0.111 60 0.095 *
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.167 5 0.513 0.165 47 0.000 *** 0.103 60 0.000 ***
Somers' d 0.667 5 0.025 ** 0.568 47 0.000 *** 0.510 60 0.000 ***
Eta 0.662 5 0.569 47 0.579 60
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
(1) - Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
1 - CEO 2 - Member of the Board 3 - Middle Manager
 
Chi-square based tests are not feasible due to lack of sufficient observations. 
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Table 2c: Objective 
Control variable: Objective
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =112
Symmetric
Kendall's tau-b 0.483 20 0.001 *** 0.567 47 0.000 *** 0.399 44 0.001 ***
Gamma 0.687 20 0.001 *** 0.752 47 0.000 *** 0.568 44 0.001 ***
Asymmetric
Lambda 0.273 20 0.060 * 0.161 47 0.122 0.040 44 0.562
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.225 20 0.074 * 0.123 47 0.002 *** 0.066 44 0.137
Somers' d 0.528 20 0.001 *** 0.610 47 0.000 *** 0.444 44 0.001 ***
Eta 0.528 20 0.625 47 0.523 44
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
Only 1 case
1 - Minimum profitability 2 - Other quantitative objective 3 - Qualitative objectives 4 - 1, 2 and 3 together
 
 
 
Table 2d: Previlevel 
Control variable: Level Internationalization
Situation 1 Value N Significance Value N Significance Value N Significance
 NTotal =107
Symmetric
Kendall's tau-b 0.308 41 0.003 *** 0.529 27 0.000 *** 0.563 39 0.000 ***
Gamma 0.446 41 0.003 *** 0.698 27 0.000 *** 0.747 39 0.000 ***
Asymmetric
Lambda 0.192 41 0.017 ** 0.167 27 0.245 0.087 39 0.311
Goodman and Kruskal Tau 0.101 41 0.027 ** 0.143 27 0.034 ** 0.142 39 0.001 ***
Somers' d 0.353 41 0.003 *** 0.573 27 0.000 *** 0.616 39 0.000 ***
Eta 0.370 41 0.544 27 0.648 39
* Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; *** Significant at a 10% level
1 - Lower level 2 - Medium level 3 - Higher level
 
Chi-square based tests are not feasible due to lack of sufficient observations. 
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Table 3 - “Typeofcountry” and different types of behavioural rules 
 
 
 
TypeofCountry and Numbehav (Sit. 1)
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance
Independence
Pearson Chi-sqaure 60.2 4 112 0.000 *** 18.0 4 112 0.001 ***
Likelihood ration 73.4 4 112 0.000 *** 18.7 4 112 0.001 ***
Symmetric
Cramer' V 0.519 - 112 0.000 *** 0.284 - 112 0.001 ***
Contingency coef. 0.591 - 112 0.000 *** 0.372 - 112 0.001 ***
Kendall's tau-b 0.212 112 0.008 *** 0.129 112 0.120
Gamma 0.283 - 112 0.008 *** 0.214 - 112 0.120
- -
Directional
Lambda 0.233 - 112 0.000 *** 0.028 - 112 0.857
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.214 - 112 0.000 *** 0.118 - 112 0.000 ***
Somers' d 0.216 - 112 0.008 *** 0.110 - 112 0.120
Eta square 0.725 - 112 0.352 112
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
TypeofCountry and Numbehav (Sit. 1)
Tests Value Deg. Freed N Significance Value Deg. Freed N Significance
Independence
Pearson Chi-sqaure 34.3 4 112 0.000 *** 77.1 4 112 0.000 ***
Likelihood ration 31.7 4 112 0.000 *** 93.2 4 112 0.000 ***
Symmetric
Cramer' V 0.409 - 112 0.000 *** 0.370 - 112 0.097 *
Contingency coef. 0.501 - 112 0.000 *** 0.464 - 112 0.097 *
Kendall's tau-b 0.212 112 0.002 *** 0.137 - 112 0.121
Gamma 0.307 - 112 0.002 *** 0.184 - 112 0.121
- -
Directional
Lambda 0.056 - 112 0.563 - - - (1)
Goodman Kruskal Tau 0.117 - 112 0.000 *** 0.073 - 112 0.003 ***
Somers' d 0.209 - 112 0.002 *** 0.129 - 112 0.121
Eta square 0.423 - 112 0.819 112
*** Significant at a 1% level; ** Significant at a 5% level; * Significant at a 10% level
(1) Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
Rules of Extrinsic Origin Rules of Intrinsic Origin
Rules Originated in the Present Rules Originated in the Past
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